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'· 
Tape Three, Side Five, 16 May 1984. Currey interview with Major 
General Edward Geary Lansdale, at his home in McLean, Virginia. 
Currey: good. At abou t the time of the beginning of American parti-
cipation in the Vietnamese conflict, your military colleagues were 
worrying and studying about Soviet planning and theory. And you 
were worrying and studying about Mao's plans and theor~ ies. What 
, what, what caused you to have this inteest in trying to understand 
Asians and what was happening 
. . '] 
1n Asia. 
L: Well, that was after World War II and at the time the Cold War 
'f-.,__rt-t' "J 
was s .E-aih ng .. That was back in Washington talking on interdepart-
mental meetings and policy discussions and so forth. with folks I 
knew in the general staff, the JCS staffs, etc. State, and what 
have you, on some of the problems. And they were conditioned by 
w {ft. 
our relationships ~ primarily tlthe soviet union and how the soviets 
were trying to foment revolutions throughout the world. I had seen 
the NMlfl(XXMMXX Huks out in the Philippines, observed them, had gone 
in closely and seen how they organized themselves polittically as 
well as ~ guerrillas and seen what their political commisars or 
cadre were teaching their own forces and how they were using self-
criticism for morale and discipline purposes) and I discovered that 
there was quite a difference in outlook on guerrillas and on revolu-
tion betwe e n the chinese method, the soviet, · and Mao won out 
in the countryside. The soviets were thinking of fac t ories and 
C: That's right. Yeah. 
L: workers, the proletariat were not farmers which they could be in 
China. But in the soviet union they were the workers or factory 
people. There were a lot of differences that way, and the people 
back here weren't looking at them that way at all. I had just seen 
one thing first hand; I'd discovered it was very diffe r ent from what 
our looking at soviets w e r e . I started talking to people who 
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had seen the soviet partisans in action and figuring how they were 
operated and set up. They wer e always not the leaders of a revolu-
tion but always operating as adjuncts of regular forces. They 
w 0 .... 1 ,i 1-t .t.- 11-e_, 
always h..a...d a regular force and then the partisans would be out b e hind 
e nemy lines someplace or in a foreign country but would need a regu-
lar force to gain their objectives. And the chinese were thinking 
"You gain your objectives with the guerrillas. And that is your 
main force. And you gradually change your guerrilla force into a 
regular force as you succeed. It's a different approach to things 
and you look at your 
ing differently. The 
resources differently and your methods of fight-
J ' (:.. f-e. r e, "'+ • 
importance of certain actions /1"re- For example, 
our main bumpings into the communists in our hemisphere were almost 
7 
entirely those fomented by the soviets, the comintern type of stuff 
being done, and all the original organizing in South America were 
done by p eo ple trained in Moscow. They were interested in going out 
and working with the proletariat and again, they were workers, and 
the people in South America again, were mostly farmers. And thank 
godl they missed that. The Cubans are starting to catch on, that's 
the trouble. Now, in Central America, they' re starting to get out 
in the countryside. They still haven't caught on entirely, but th ey 
got a lot of vulnerabilities on their side. They thank god! 
they haven't caught onsas early as they might. And guys like Che 
Guevarra, for example, were silly as guerrilla leaders down in 
South America before, I remember I was talking to th e Bolivians about 
him and he was captured and killed down ther e but they had no popular 
base ~ there. 
C: They were a group of bandits in Bolivia. 
L: Essentially. 
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L; Essentially. The guerrillas were. They were separate. But they 
also had egos, very big, and they got their pictures taken, and th e y 
to 
made the mistake of going in to the drug store/xxa getxixg them de-
veloped. Here in the drug store you find guy 1 with bandoleers of 
ammunition across your hands tucked in a la Napoleon a--R-4 ;,, 
your shirt, you know, and your knees bent, posing as great heroes 
and carrying arms and everything. That isn't some simple guy out 
we're just woodcutters out in the jungle, you know. The hell 
you are, you know. 
where they were. 
So the government got tipped off right away 
These guys are no good. 
are. They came 
Yeah, 
in from 
I know where they 
-pl a ce n a me .5'u..c. ~ eu-. d 
and 
everybody's talking about them up there. They advertised themselves 
too much. 
C: So many of our people in the military and in government would 
not have heard of the three kingdom stories; \ ~ ou ask them about a 
------ - -
ma n d a r i n , a n d t h e y ' d s a y , 0 h ye a h , t ha t ' s a c h i n e s e r e s t a r a u n t &'ct-£d ow ..-i 
on 5th Avenue. The mandate of heaven, they 
L: No. They knew mandarin, tho. The Americans cau &ght on. That 
is supposed to be a remote, authoritarian figure. He wears a coat 
that goes down over his knees, down to his toe-tops, and it's all 
buttoned up and his hands are in ~h e sleeves of this big slee J ved 
thing he's wearing. Peopl e have to come up and kow-tow to him. 
That's the type of guy he is. And it's a negativ i e figure. 
C: um hmmm. 
L: But this other 
they talk about. 
is what the people themselves are like and what 
-.h, l,i £-Ve.,,r 
And you have you're attuned k0xx for anything 
they're doing. I went down to Venezuela and they wer e , they had a 
great revolt g0ixgx0x~x«0mmHxixk~x going down there, communist, 
,~ 
-4- / 
and the army had gone out to get them and our advisers were there, 
and they had aircraft going and they had artillery. These were co llege 
l,-t.d 
students who ~ gone j out in the summer to have themselves a REVOlu-
tion, take over the country. They'd read Mao and Mao's principles, 
and he'd said, "you start in the mountains." Well, they went out 
F a l coV? 
in the ([illegible place name]) hills, those are mountains to them, 
These are city kids, university type scholars, and they'd never been 
out before, so they go to these hills and they they they 
had weapons they'd brought from town with them. The army went out to 
get them and the American advisers hadi ~ rtillery and aircraft eM'.l"t "-t('.:°f--e.r -ilte..~, 
H'J.Cn:: . I went down there, and it took me about 2 seconds to find 
out that there's no water up in those hills. Where's the water? 
e,d 
Well, there's one farm has an artesian~ they had to go way deep, and 
-, o 
they had an artesian source of water, that means they must be there, 
you know, after 2-3 days they start getting thirsty and have to go 
someplace to find some water. The National Guard down there is ~ 
rJ -+-
re a 11 y the national guard, but a combination police force, forestry 
service, ranger type of thing. The only true military outfit close 
(:.:s4.' "j 
to the people. They write all the -W ghia g reports, they're the county 
agents for agriculture, scattered all over the country. So I went 
down. It's a big operation going on. My god! Allowed there only 
5 days so I can just spend part of my time there. 
National Guard. 
I spot a sergeant 
I went up and 2 men coming down the trail. 
right next to all these batteries 
"' e,,""..sy 
firing these salvos going up. 
Aircraft going over and machine guns going and bombs going up in the 
mountains. ~ And these guys were just shaking their heads. I said 
"Excuse me. Could you please tell me where the enemy is" "Yeah. 
They're up at so-and-so';s farm; they're up there." I say, II 
"Are they watching this? Enjoying this big display of fireworks? 
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"Y es . They're scared. They don't know how to get back into town. 
They_ didn't have any water, so they had to go over there for water." 
I said, "Well, I'll see if I can get the general over here. Would 
you mind telling him that the enemy X uh, well, will accept th~ir 
surrender? and they " Nobody down there had done the simplest 
damn things that you could think of in a situation like that. The 
Americans wouldn't talk to me. You and your fancy ideas,they said. 
I'm not fancy. This is very simple. Realistic stuff. And they 
said, "Well, we know how to fight guerrillas. You leave us alone. 
We're real military people." And I said, "That's alright. 
the 4th of July. 
C: Lord help us. 
L: Yeah. 
C: Lordhelp us. 
Shoot off some more fireworks. 
It Is 
C: Well general, I said I'd spend about an hour after lunch and 
an hour' ;s gone by. 
L: They got very mad at me. They were trying to help the Venezuelan~ 
navy do something with 5 destroyers and the navy wanted so many sub-
b,.__.,._..- ; ,. e~ -
marines, 5 or 6.5.,__ r said, "Destroyers, if they're very effective, 
yes. They need a coast guard here. They're training people 
5f-u ff'.'.-
up in Cuba and sending them down here to sabatoge L,hings that belong 
to the state now. Petroleum products and pipelines and all the rest. 
And the sabateurs are being trained in Mexico and coming in over the 
beaches here. Yeah. 
yeah, I'd be all for 
You got something to stop them a 
t-k.t.- t--
~ - Go up some of these rivers a 
little bit, 
little bit, 
they need some patrolling along them. But not subma'{,.rines. Gotta 
think international defense they said, and the panama canal and so 
on. I said, well we can worry about that ourselves, but let these 
people start helping th emselves and their own country to be~in with. 
/ 
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Very simple things. I said, "Outboard motors on a canoe might do more 
or SoMefl,.,.,j 
than a submarine l\ would." Jesus! I don't understand. 
C;-:,:. d,,,t e,-1h.er, 6 ene,-,._/, 
C: Well, I hope people listen to you when you go off to the Head 
Shed and talk. 
L: Well, let's see if they do this time. I don't know. I've been 
doing this all my life and I was trying to do it before they 
I' 6 
got in to Vietnam, ~ while we were in Vietnam, and there are a lot of 
Americans who did the right thing over there. 
C: yup. 
L: They used to get so frustrated. They used to come in and see me ~ 
in Saigon and let down _their hair. Why the hell are they dOing this? 
~€, 
~his is what they want ~ to do and i tell them it does no good, so, 
all of them just breaking their hearts and trying to do the right 
thing. I wasn't unique that way at all. 
C: Did Graham Greene ever talk to you? 
L: No. The only time I ~ver saw him, he was sitting at a hotel 
terrace with some French, he was very close to the French, in 1954, 
!~~ ~ I;/~ D~ ----d I ~ I guess it wa s. The (J ca-i,s) 1b-ho were a husbnad and wife writing Z),.,.,-d,.,.s 
I P. ·T:( ..,.. ,., ... e~ 
team, with the New York Times, were in Vietnam and t ~ had asked 
me to have dinner with them. They were coming down from Hanoi. 
Before going up there, they had an interview with Ho Chi Minh and 
f:'or {. l,...e. W\. 
I gave them some questions~ to ask him. 1 said I would like to hear 
from them on the answers. So they said yes, and they came back to 
have dinner with me and they were staying at the Continental Hotel 1 
and when I drove in there the French officers were sitting -er;. ~he 
KRxxxaR«Rx out on the terrace on the sidewalk and Graham Greene was 
sitting with them. There were a whole bunch of th e m, 30,40,50, and 
i 
I wasnt very popular with the French. I 
1)'-'l '<'J;V\5 
they started booing me. 
guess it was Graham Greene said something, he knew the ~-a-R-5-; and 
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said something, and Peg stuck out her tongue at him out on the side-
walk and said "But we love him," and turned around and gave me and 
a b~g hug and kiss . I said, Well, I'm going to get written up i 





But I had a french poodle at the time with me 
car with me and they were commenting 
ho Id 
frenchmen and ~ them by the ankle 
about my 
with his 
and he was 
(vV"''l5 1 f-oo 
dog 6) He used 
teeth on their 
ankle so they coulddt move when they ' d walk anywhere near me . I 
don't know . . he could tell I couldn ' t tell whether there 
was an odor about them or some t hing. So I'd say " Let them alo n e. 
Be a nice dog . " "S I R. HE BIT ME!" No, he didn't. I looked and 
it didn't 
1 1-..:t f 
C: t; ell 1s 
c:L. 5? 
T 
C : I ke e p 
L: We 11, 
C : Yeah . Well lets see . Today is the 17th of 
L: Thursday . 
C '. A-<-y, y Ah 
G: Yeah . General Lansdale, how was it possible no . . how 
did it happen that a ~ Air Force l ieutenant colonel became the Director 
of Clandestine Operations in Vietnam? 
L: I never was. Tha t" s an interesting title . 
C: Well, that's what the author, the editor of this book I borrowed 
from you said . He sp o ke of you as an American intel l igence operative 
who shored up the Diem regime in its earliest days and directed 
claNDESTINE operations against 
L: Oh-£. I had many fictional titles that people threw at me. 
Americans . French. The communists . The enemy. Our friendly 
Vietnamese . All had different titles for me . I didn't pay much 
-8-
~ 
attention. I used to give myself titles once in awhile ~ keep my 
own ·records straight on who I was, but I knew pretty much what I 
wanted to do. I had been in a meeting in Washington when xkR 
Secretary of State Dulles, at a meeting, said he wanted to send me out 
to Vietnam and I said not to help the french and he said No, I want 
you to do 
against the 
what you did in the Philippines to help the people there 
-rf-i,:.t.. f I~ ~s 
communists. Those were my orders. -~ clearly defined 
as anything ever was. So I went and actually tried to do my best ~b do 
what I thot I had done in the Philippines to help the Filipinos. 
And I did it i VietnaM 
C: Bu ~ I am so curious about this becauseJ you know, I've had a kind 
of interesting career and I'm a lieutenant colonel, at least until 
the promotion board meets in October, and then I'll probably be a 
private. Uh, you know, I've met some interesting generals, a few 
secretaries for congressmen, but our secretary of state doesn't invite 
me to meet in gs or ask me what I think ~ . o., . .b ~ 1.,<.,'f -J- h .' nJ s , - . 
L: [hearty laugh ] 
did 
C: uh, how c~ this come about? 
L: Well, it came about through my experience in the Philippines. 
The only way I've ever figured it out, Filipinos and I fell in love 
with each other. Almost anything I did there was done with tremendous 
brotherly love on both parts. It was sort of an ideal situation. 
So while I was there, for example, in an army command, I'd been in 
intelligence, and MacArthur sent one of his his chief of staff 
iMHKMMX Sunderland, down to Manila, and Sunderland came in and saw me 
~ in intelligence, I was actually deputy G-2 at the time, and he 
said, General MacArthur sat up in his headquarters ~ in Tokyo read-
ing all the Manila dailies, they fly them up to him fast, and he 
-9-
would mark th e front pages that were anti f American comm e nt, t ,, at had 
anti~Americ a n GI comments actually, the American Gis were misbehaving 
and there we re some slurs against Americans, on the front 
f 
pages 0 almost 
every Manila newspaper, and h e was very worried about the PIO down 
th e re. The PIO was a full colonel in our command and he'd given 
Sunderland orders to go down and find some officer to be J ~~ O to 
f'V\_e ri+iovted t' '1 
change all that and get us, the Americans, -~ favorable terms in 
h ,- .s. 
the front pages, c~ c.i:i::~=1~.n... was ~ major conc e rn. So Sunderland said 
I have checked w4--t.""-fl- th e top of the Philippine government, with all 
the newspap e rss, with the top social peopl e in the Philippines, with 
the top business people, and the only American in this command that 
sfedl-L 
they all know is you. The only one they ~ favorably to as o,,,n,,e S'ot'l,(_eo,ce., 
they can talk to is you. None of them know who the guy is who"s 
Pio now including the editors of the papers and the radio stations 
and they all know you as a friend1 and that's a 1 1 he s a id cu-. J k e / eJ f fh ..._ -1-, ) 
And I started getting calls afterwards, questions about press 
Sa..-w 
matters and I got worried and I went in and ~-k--€H l to- the commanding 
general and I said "I'm sort of concerned. I'm getting all these 
calls about this and they ought to be r e ferred over to the PIO. 
I wonder if he's doing his job?" The general said, "Oh. Didn't we 
tell you? You are the PIO now, the public information officer, be-
cause MacArthur wants it." I said, well, as a major at the +- • .__ i me, 
-,.- I • 
..[..._ WI 4 lJ I '1 J 
w;edd-,-../to go in and we have some of the Gs are general offic e rs, 
and if I have to deal with them and straighten this out, there's 
got to be a lot of straight e ning outdown here, I'm going to need some 
backing, so I wrote up a contract saying that if I took over as PIO 
he would back me completely, And I said, if I"m in talking to some 
general, like the :ei:HIMX G-4, the G-3 was another general, if I g e t 
in a n argument with him, or some of th e subordinate commands, gen e rals, 
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and say that certain things have to be changed and that you'd back me, 
and ·if I call you up from that guy's telephone, I want you to tell him 
by +~l-e,..ph.on e. , 
right then that you back me up , n So I wrote a contract and I made the 
commanding general and his chief of staff down at our command to sign 
this; this ~ is a contract. They told me they'd never done that be-
fore. 
C: Military men don't make contracts like that. 
L: So, I did, and handled the public affairs of the US forces, the 
US Army. I set up an office downtown in Manila away from our head-
quarters, and very close to the newspapers and the media and the 
businesses--the Philippine people, in other words. I really got 
mixed up in their affairs. The airforce, the US embassy, and the 
others, all sent officers over to work out of my office and to help 
me on this because this is where the United States was in the minds 
of the emitors and publishers. If they had any questions, they would 
call me instead of calling MXX USIA down at the embassy or the airport 
or something, they'd call me. I'd respond very quickly. We changed 
the attitude 180° overnight almost. It got so that after I was there 
about a week that the only news about Americans that they ever had wo~IJ be_ 
~ if I had said that was a t~ue story. The editors took the stuff 
from me, cause I'd go after the truth real hard with a very small 
staff, it would go fast. We had a police bea~; &KR what they call 
the police blotters in the morning, to check on any American mis-
behaviors , and look it A.J oW up very quickly. , As 
o (-
a result ~ that, I 
got very, very close to all the Philippine officials and most of the 
journalists and the businessmen in the Philippines and I had 
well, I don't know how many friends I had; l000s upon 1000s of 
friends there /ft- . It was an unusual situation . They'd been in 
trouble with the Huks. As their G-2 man, I'd gone up and looked at 
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~~ru ks and gotten very close. I'd talked to their leaders. I'd gone 
out .and watched their troops operate. I'd been out at night on the 
trail. Pat .Pat is from that country. She knows where I got 
to up on the trails and where they were wandering. I got very close 
to them. Even today there are rumors out in the Philippines of an 
American out in the barricf.,doing something, getting close to people, 
someplace, them offering to put him up svernight in their homes 
he's sleeping on their floor. Immediately, everybody thinks that 
e... 
it's me t h~rMy name keeps coming up in the press. Even today in these 
elections they just held in Manila. The papers said that I was there 
+A ~r{!.. 
to make sure that w~ were decent elections held and to help the 
people hold them. The State Department, Philippine Desk, called 
and asked me told me on the telephone, Our embassy out there 
has asked us to please check and make sure whether you're in Washing-
ton area or out in the Philippines. And we were sure you were home 
here, so thanks for letting us call you and we'll let them know that 
t:<.. re,,+ 
you ~ out there, cause they're getting calls all the time from 
Filipinos and 
C: Who saw you just last night wandering through 
L: Well, they heard that I was there and they're old friends and 
they're trying to get together and say hello. Well, that's an unusual 
t h i n g t o h a p p e n t o a n y b o d y i n t h e s e r v i c e . 5'o I t s e t me a p a r t i n t h e 
Philippines, whether I liked it or not, I was. It gave me a great 
deal of say. So I went out there to help them Nixk at the request 
IJ}V 
of their president and got together with Magsaysay and defeated the 
Huks. He stayed in the house with me and we were like brothers. 
That got known all over Asia. Very, very strong talk out in Asia. 
Some of it was picked up by Americans, which amazed me, for Americans 
usually don't hear thatsort of stuff. It gave me a chance to be myself 
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and be a little different than others. If you get that, you can jolly 
well make your own way on doing something along the lines that people 
expect from you and in the Philippines they said that they expected an 
American to behave the way I did. I was displaying the characteristics 
that they had wanted to see in an American. It reassured them, so when 
I suggested things, they listened and tried to do it. It happened the 
same way out in Vietnam, much to my surprise. I was very well known 
before I got there and I heard many times in Vietnam, people mentioning 
; " -\-- 1\.e... p ~ : l ~ yq ,tn et- 0 ,.,_ ..J.. -+ /... e r e (?.) 
Magsaysay. Phil O'Donnell f and I'd get together. We could hear them 
talking among themselves, explaining to each other who this guy was. 
My reputation had gone ahead. It became very easy, when the US would 
send me in to places where I was known, to go ahead and keep behaving 
the same way. That's the only explanation I have. 
C: Were you at Dien Bien Phu? 
L: No. No. 
C" Well 
L: I was there incidentally before it became a battleground. I went 
there in 1 53 early, in the summer, when I was out on a mission for the 
doing the O'Daniel mission for the White House. 
The French took me up there to take a look at it. 
C: Had they already decided that they were going to use that as 
L: No. This was before that decision was made. This ixxwkak was one 
of their outposts and they wanted me to see what it was like. The 
enemy was scouting around up there. They had some fortifications 
already built. 
C: Well, in this area of your role in Vietnam, someplace in these 
notes, I'm trying to find them now; well here's kind of one of them. 
-t--M~r 
Someplace in your book, I picked up wi=l-e-r--€ George Catlett Marshall 
kind of becomes a supporter of yours or at least becomes interested 
-13-
in what you were doing in Asia. N07 
L: No. 
C: O.K. 
L: Well, he helped at one point when he was secr£tary of defense. 
He had a little staff group of generals, former generals, retired 
generals, and they helped me when I was out in the Philippines. I 
was trying to get some parachutes for an airborne battalion and 
le..~+"-.--e__ 
he got me over to give a l=ec •Jt r~ at state. He was he had 
the secretary of state talking in his office. uh 
what was that guy the name I'm 
C: Would that be Acheson? 
L: Acheson. Yes. Dean Acheson . Marshall had said he could go out 
-I- t..~+- o._ c.,:1- 0.... 
in the hall and grab the first military guy who would b e a little 
better than some of the foreign service officers over at State. So 
they bet a dinner or a drink or something and Marshall's generals 
had grabbed me and had me standing next to the door as they came 
out, so they took 
helped them get a 
to tell them how I 
me over to give a lecture to State, and I'd just 
o u. f 
tr 6 eaty ~ in the Philippines so they asked me 
did that. 
C: Well, here's another note that I've written from your book. 
John Foster Dulles NKX asked me to cut my vacation short and call 
him immediately." Now is that a shorthand way of saying that down 
through channels came this request 
L: Yeah. I'm sure 
C: o q did you pick up the telephone and the man says this is Mr. 
Dulles. 
L: When was this now? 
C: Uh, let me put this in context some time in 1953. You've 
come back to Washington, DC, and then you go on a vacation to Florida 
-14-
and this Dulles seems to have wanted you to return to the 
Philippines immediately. 
L: No. It • wasn't Dulles. 
C: It was before June of 1953. 
L: Yeah. No. That was actually Magsaysay to Eisenhower and the 
White House to Defense. 
C: That's even greater! 
L: Yeah. 
C: [luaghter] Oh! General! You've had such an interesting career! 
L: Magsaysay used to call me at home and he was this must have 
been early •' 54, maybe late '53, early ' 54. He started begging me to come 
vt •S 
back to the Philippines and help him with -~· congress. I told him 
No, I had to get ready, 1 was going to another country, which sort of 
upset him a little. Then I got a call, it was the it had gone 
through channels • but he had called Eisenhower right after 
talking with me, 
... J.-. e... :1ot- M~1 
~ w h e n I s a i d n o • He asked for me 
by name thru the president personally. I got sent back to the 
Philippines. / 
C: Well, I've got a couple of others. Were you promoted to colonel 
in 1954? Full colonel? 
L: 
r-..+ l,l) tf:- "5 
No. / l Before then. It might have been in ' 53, I forget what year 
it was. 
C: When did you become a brigadier? 
L: Oh, much later. I was a colonel for a very long time. To his 
wife: Yeah? 
Mrs. L: You're wanted on the telephone. Spence Davis. 
L: O.K. pardon me. 
I 
-15-
[lengthy blank space on the tape] 
TAPE ENDS ~ ITHOUT RESUMING CONVERSATION 
